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RUSSIA AND THE GREAT WAR, 1914-1917
By Dr. OSKAR P. TRAUTMANN
The gene1"ution which st'ill remem.bers the (keat War freqttently looks
ba,ck Ctllcl compa-res or cont-rusts the events of then and today. Future
hi.~t01·ial1s. we ?nau be certa-in, will devote ?!tuck ti,ne and energy towa,rd
the inve,~Uga-tionof the similarities and difference/!; between the Great War
and P1"esent events.
The followin.fJ stOTy of R1tRsia and the Great Wa1' is of particular
interest a,s it was 7V'1-itten shm"tlll befo?'e the olttb-reak of the Ger1ll,{I-n-Sovict
?var. The author intended it to be a historical 8tOO'1/ and not a parallel
to the pl'e,~ellt Wa,1". All the ?1Wre interesting (we the tho/tght:s provoked
b1f it when we1'ead it now. Even the Russian names for the war of 1911,
and 191,1 are 'identical--"The Second War for the Fatherl.(J.nd." (The first
u'u-e; that of 1812 agai.nst Na.poleon, the second in Tsarist terminology was
the one of 1911,. That wa,?', hmcever. is denounced by the Bolshe'lJ'iks a.s an
"lmperiaH.st" war. and hence according to their reekoning the present war
i8 the second one.) The present probl6'm8 of Poland, of the Balkans, of
TW'kell and the St1"aits. of Russia's relations with Great Britain-they all
loom, closer when we ?'entMnber the'ir role in the last war.
The author is pu,rticularly well-equipped to write on interna,tional
affairs as he has them at ki.s finger-tips. being ki1nself an eminent d-iplonwt
with almost faTty yean to hbr cred:it in the -German diplomatic service. Hw
fi-rat fOTe(qn 110St was the capital of tke Tsars, St. Petersburg, and all
through his career, be it in the Foreign Office in Berlin o-r in diplnrnatio
positions abroa(l, he has preserved his enthusiastic interest in Russ-ian prob-
lems and his knowledge of the Russian language. Last year. Dr. Traut-
mann pu.blished a book on the history of Russian foreign pol-icy, for which,
Wue to his posit-iorr., he was able to use many official and p1'ivate sources.
The t·itle of the Book i8 "The Singers' Bridge" after the col.!oquial name
for the Tsu1"ist Foreign Ministry located at the so-called Singers' Bridge
in St. Petersburg.
Since 1921 D'r. T1"aut7ltann has been intimately connected with events
in the Fa1" East, Ii'rst in Japan, and since 1931 us Ministe1' and later as
Ambassador to China. In the winter of 1997/1938 his prominent role in
the di.~cu.ssion for a peaceful settlement of the Sino.Japanese conflict
created much attention.-K .1\>1.
CHANCE AND NECESSITY
A well-known surgeon, when lectur-
ing on injuries to the arteries of the
neck, used to tell his pupils that the
World War might have been avoided
if there had been a surgeon in the re-
tinue of the assassinated Archduke
Franz Ferdinand in Serajevo who had
known how to stop a carotid haemor-
rhage by quick action. This anecdote
shows the entire absurdity of placing
importance on mere chance in history.
Ortega y Gasset has made some ex-
cellent observations about chance and
history. He considers it impossible to
foresee whether lightning will strike a
tree with its fiery sword, "but we know
that cherry-trees will never produce
poplar-leaves." It is indeed an acci-
dent that a man of Caesar's peculiar
mentality should have lived in the first
century before Christ. A Roman of the
second century B.C. could not have
foreseen the individual destiny repre-
sented by Caesar's life; but he could
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well have prophesied the da,wn of a
Caesarian era in the first century. Cato
predicted quite accurately what was
about to happen at that time.
According to Ortega we have grasped
a situation historically if we have seen
it arise of necessity from a previous
one. This conception of necessity can
be given not only a psychological but
also an astrological-fatalistic meaning.
Spengler quotes Napoleon's words: "I
feel myself driven toward a goal that
I do not know."
The historian is a "reversed pro-
phet," and Spengler bas predicted that
the World War was only the prepara-
tion for a new Caesarian era for man-
kind. The accidents leading to its out-
break have no special significance;
nevertheless the entire course of events
has something psychologically inexor-
able. In this sense the words of the
President of the Imperial Duma (the
Russian Parliament), Rodsianko, are
particularly characteristic. At the be-
ginning of the war he addressed the
historic meeting of the Duma on August
8, 1914, as follows: "We all know very
well that Russia did not want a war,
that designs of conquest are foreign
to the Russian people, but Fate itself
has chosen to involve us in war."
SAZONOV
The man who held the tiller of Rus-
sian foreign policy when the Empire
of the Tsars entered upon its greatest
catastrophe, the World War, was For-
eign Minister Sazonov. He impressed
foreign diplomats with whom he came
in contact as a sober, deliberate man,
who, without wishing to shine by his
wit, knew exactly what he wanted. On
the other hand we know that he was
a sickly, excitable man. filled with a
burning Russian patriotism which al-
most bordered 011 fanaticism. He is
credited with intellect-he had' the face
of a fox-but at the same time it is
emphasized that he lacked judgment,
admittedly a desirable attribute in a
Foreign Ministe'r. His career allowed
him to develop in the seclusion of rather
insignificant positions. It is possible
that he was only made Vice-Minister
and later Foreign Minister because he
was a brother-in-law of the Russian
Premier Stolypin. He lacked know-
ledge of the Balkans and the Near East
-the main issues of Russian foreign
policy.
Probably he was excellent as Vice-
Minister, just the man to deal with for-
eign diplomats: "Tel brille au second
plan. qui s'eclipse au premie·r." But
he did not possess the strength and the
spiritual independence which the helms-
man of a great empire should have had
in such fateful times. Soon foreign
policy under him was no longer deter-
mined in his Ministry, but by his Am-
bassadors and Ministers, Hartwig in
Belgrade, Tcharykov in Constantinople,
and Isvolsky in Paris.
THE STRAITS
Did Sazonov really have no great
leading idea for the foreign policy of
Rus.sia? This one cannot maintain,
but his thinking lacked originality. He
wanted tQ let the political situation
mature gradually, and to prepare every-
thing for the day when Russia could
carry out her historic task, that is, con-
trol of the Dardanelles and the Bos-
porus. First of all, Germa.ny had to be
rendered innocuous by discussions of a
political nature, which, however, re·
mained vague, and by economic
concessions. Meanwhile the Balkan
territory was prepared in such a way
that Russia had only to press the but-
ton for the Balkan nations to march
against Turkey. When this coincided
with a complete understanding of Rus-
sia with France and England, the mo-
ment of realization had, according to
Sazonov's ideas, arrived.
Sazonov was counting on the im1er
weakness and early disintegration of
the Austro-Hungarian monarchy. The
Tsar was apparently of the same opin-
ion. He once spoke to the British Am-
bassador Buchanan on this subject and
divided up the inheritance. For Ger-
many he had reserved the German pro-
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vinces of Austria as booty. Buchanan
ventured to say to him that such
changes in the map of Europe could
hardly be made without a general
war. It seems that the Tsar had
never thought out the final con-
sequences. Of aU the leading men,
the Russian Prime Minister Kokovzoy
was the only one to consider a
European war as the greatest pos-
sible national disaster for Russia.
He did not manage to stay in office very
long; hence in the end there \vas no
counter-weight to the patriots. As for
Sazonov's feelings towards Germany,
he has said in his memoirs that no one
can love Germany: it is sufficient not
to hate Germany. On the other hand
Buchanan has testified that he was a
staunch friend of England and a loyal
and enthusiastic collaborator in the
Anglo-Russian Entente.
HEADING FOR THE
CATASTROPHE
Such was the man Sazonov who guid-
ed Russian foreign policy at a time
when the French Ambassador in Vienna
wrote illuminatingly about the state of
Europe: "The feeling that the nations
are moving towards the battlefields, as
if driven by an irresistible force, grows
from day to day". Sazonov, too, yield-
ed to this mood. Even the German
Ambassador at the Court of the Tsar
expressed the opinion that, of all per-
sonalities who could be considered for
the post of Russian Foreign Minister,
Sazonov was still the best. This shows
that by now circumstances had become
more powerful than the men who
guided the destinies of the nations.
Maeterlinck has written a book about
termites. In it he describes a species
of these industrious insects which, in
many years of painstaking toil, in-
geniously construct a habitation for
their people. Then, more or less period-
ically, an inexplicable movement ap-
pears in the swarm of termites, a kind
of revolution, and the whole ingenious
construction is senselessly destroyed by
the builders themselves.
Mankind, impelled towards the bat-
tlefields, was approaching a ~imilar
catastrophe. Would things have been
different if, in place of Sazonov, there
had been some other Russian Foreign
Minister? From Gortchakov through
Giers. Lobanov, Lamsdorff to Iswolsky
and Sazonoy there ran a logical chain
of development, which at that moment
it was no longer possible to interrupt.
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs had
its own life, its own spirit. The' men
who, some by chance, some by the logic
of events. stood at the head of the State,
were subject to this spirit.
"C'EST LA GUERRE
EUROPEENNE"
When Sazonov entered his office in
the Foreign Ministry on the morning
of July 24, 1914, Vienna's ultimatum to
Serbia, the result of the assassination
of the Austrian heir-apparent, had al-
ready become known in St. Petersburg
during the night. It had caused tre-
mendous excitement. "C'est la guerre
europeenne," were Sazonov's words to
his aide, Baron Moritz Schilling. These
words show something of the astrologi-
cal nature of the events of those eight
fateful days. Everything we see un-
folding before us in a breathless rush-
ing back and forth was nothing but the
"mise en sc~ne" of a great historical
drama, as General Dobrorolsky, Chief
of the Mobilization Department of the
Russian General Staff, put it. If we
take into account that the characters
of the chance actors of this drama. were
already determined, we can understand
that the end of the drama was a cer-
tainty.
Whole libraries have been written
about the question of where the guilt
for the outbreak of the war lay. This
is understandable, for the guilt-clause
in lhe Treaty of Versailles made a study
of this question appear imperative. But
in e.."(amining the outbreak of the war
from the stand-point of Russian poli-
tics, we will not discuss the question of
guilt. We will simply observe events.
A diplomat once said that there is
no such thing as a moral or an immoral
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policy, but only a good or a bad one.
And only results can decide whether a
policy is good or bad. From this point
of view the entry of Russia into the
European war was the greatest stupi-
dity ever committed by the statesmen
of a country in a decisive hour.
RUSSIAN SENTIMENT
Has Sazonov at least the excuse that
he only put the match to the fire that
others had laid? One cannot deny that
the war was popular in many circles of
the Russian people. It was called the
"second war for the fatherland" and
given a similar significance to that of
the war of 1812 against Napoleon.
Under the last three Russian Tsars
relations with Germany had constalJ1tly
deteriorated. The creation in itself of
a powerful German Empire did not, ac-
cording to the ideas of many Russian
statesmen, correspond to the real in-
terests of Russia; the Austro-Germain
alliance. and the support given to the
Austrian policy in the Balkans by
Germany. had led to growing ill-feeling
toward Germany. This ill-feeling was
fanned by France. The Franco-Rus-
sian alliance. originally born of Russia's
fear of political isolation, had become,
almost from the beginning, an instru-
ment of French rather than of Russian
policy. In 1871 Renan had advised the
French: "attiser la haine toujours
croissante de-s Slaves contre les Alle-
mands, favoriser Ie pan-slavisme, servir
sans reserves toutes les 'ambitions
fusses." This advice had been follow-
ed. and this method had gradually
directed Russian thought-formerly by
no means anti-German-against Ger-
many.
THE RUSSIAN INTELLIGENTSIA
The Russian intelligentsia in its poli-
tical thinki.ng felt much more attracted
to the democratic ideals of the West
than toward.s Prussianism. In the
latter the Russian liberals saw a like-
ness to their own government. The
Russian socialists saw in Germany
only the stronghold of reaction, which
was abetting Russia's own autocratism.
Hence there were no bonds of sympa-
thy to be severed in order to famliliarize
the minds of the people with the idea
of war with Germany. Here, too, the
inner-political ideas of liberal Russia
must not be disregarded. The mani-
festo of October 1905, designed to give
to the Russians those basic rights which
the people of the rest of Europe al-
ready possessed for generations, had,
through the reactionary measures of
Stolypin and his su~cessors, shrunk to
insignificance. After a period of dull
despa'ir the Russian intellectual saw in
war an opportunitcY to gain for the
people through the "Union sacree" of
people and government, that freedom'
of which they were being deprived.
The Bolshevist-revolutionary circles,
too, felt that war formed the only
possible basis for a revolution; their
leaders, however, were abroad and had
no influence on the course of events.
The leading circles in society and
high officialdom, which influenced for-
eign policy. had been won over to the
extreme course, after the going of
Kokovzov had freed them from re-
straint. Under the pressure of political
events even the rightist groups of the
Duma gave up their sympathies for
Germany.
The old military bonds formerly
connecting Germany and Rl1Ssia had
long since been loosened. Military
circles looked towards friendly France.
Russian Grand Dukes had gone to the
French borders and had inspected the
fortifications of Lorraine which were
directed a'gainst Germany. Many years
before the war, Russian maneuvers had
been openly designed on the plan of a
war again.st Germany and Sweden, and
even foreign military attaches had
been invited to attend. When a Japa-
nese military commission visited Russia
in the spring of 1914, it could observe
hatred for Germany everywhere in
the officers' messes.
PAN-SLAVISM
With few exceptions the press had
been anti-G€rman for many decades.
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It was more or less under the spell of
nationalistic and Pan-Slavistic ideas,
or it was opportunistic and without
convictions. Pan-Slavism, rekindled
by the events in the Balkans, had in-
jected into the sentiments of Germans
and Slavs a strong feeling of antago-
nism which really did not exist between
the two peoples. One can well say
that no one has understood the Slav
temperament better than the Germans,
whereas it has always remained foreign
to the English and French.
Now the loves and hates, antipathies
and sympathies of nations, however
gr.eat the influence they may ~x~rt
emotionally, are not, as a rule, deCISIve
factors in politics. That they should
lead to a war seems absurd. It is the
opposing political interests which lead
to conflicts between nations. Was it
insoluble, this problem of conflicting
interests in the Balkans between
Russia and Austria, and Russia and
Germany? Sazonov apparently thought
so. Through his policy he had attained
positions in the Balkans the relinquis~­
ment of which would have been eqUI-
valent to a humiliation. Sazonov was
ready to risk a fight, and he believed
that the advantages would be on the
s~de of Russia.
WAR AIMS
By the war aims of a country one
can recognize whether the war was
justified. What were the war aims
that a Russian statesman could have
in relation to Germany? Giers, one
of Sazonov's predecessors, had realized
long ago that the destruction of Ger-
many's position as a power could never
be in the interest of Russia; but Sazo-
nov had forgotten this great truth.
Even the question, whether the dissolu-
tion of the Austrian Empire were in
the true interest of Russia, would
probably still have been denied by
G<>rtchakov. Apparently Sazonov
never even considered this. The whole
war policy of the Entente during the
war has shown that Russia, "ith no
political ideas of her own, became in
the end entirely the tool of French and
English politics.
The best criticism of Russian war
aims was pronounced by the great
Russian Statesman Witte in his con-
versation with the French Amba'Ssador
PaIeologue at the beginning of the-
war: "And then, what are the con-
quests that are dangled before our
eyes? East Prussia? Doesn't the
Emperor already have far too many
Germans among his subjects? Galicia?'
Why, that is full of Jews, and then,
from the day on which We annex the
Polish territories of Austria and Prus-
sia we would lose all of Russian Poland
. . .What else do they let us hope
for? Constantinople? The return of'
the Cross to St. Sophia's, the Bosporus,
the Dardanelles? That is so crazy
that it is not worth wasting time over
it."
The Pan-Slavistic war aims of Rus-
sia collapsed immediately, when, at the
beginning of the war, the Russian
steam-roller failed to make any head-
way. Nothing more was said of the
Slav brothers or of East Prussia.
Finally there was nothing left but the'
Dardanelles and Constantinople. But
even this objective became more and
more unreal as it could not be attained
by Russia's own efforts. It was neces-
sary to bring in mysticism to justi~y
the continuation of the war for thIS
aim. St. Sophia in Constantinople ~as
glorified as the central idea of R~~sIan
religious life, while the purely mIht:arY
fight to win her had to be taken Illto-
the bargain-or was even commended
-'as a necessary preparatory step to-
wards the realization of the religious
ideals. Russian policy had been sacri-
ficed to a romantic idea which was no
longer based on any genuine economic
or political interests.
"NOW YOU C.4N SMASH YOUR
TELEPHONE"
IFrom the confusion of those tumul.
tuous days before the World WaT we
will pick out one single instance. We
know that on July 29 partial mobili
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zation against Austria was proclaimed
in St. Peter.sburg. Orders had also
been given for general mobilization but
were countermanded at the last mo-
ment by the Tsar because of a recon-
'Ciliatory telegram from the Kaiser.
There was great excitement in Rus-
sian military circles over this order
and counter-order. It was feared that
a partial mobilization would only con-
fuse the carrying out of general mobi-
lization. The Chief of the General Staff
Yanushkevitch was determined to
make one more effort with the Tsar
on the following day to obtain a
general mobilization.
Since the Ts'ar did not react to re-
presentations made over the telephone
and also refused to receive Yanush-
kevitch, Sazonov came to his assistance
and forced from the reluctant Tsar,
after an hour's conversation on the
afternoon of July 30, the order for
general mobilization-which meant
war. Sazonov's telephone conversation
from the Peterhof Palace at four
o'clock in the afternoon, in which he
informed Yanushkevitch of the Tsar's
decision, has become famous for his
last remark: "Now you can smash
your telephone." A second counter-
mand of the order was now impossible.
SAZONOV AND THE TSAR
Sazonov himself has described this
historic scene, at the same time
revealing the motive which caused the
Foreign Minister to intercede for this
fateful decision of the Tsar. The
Tsar was silent at the utterances of
his Minister. Then he said, with a
hoarse voice that betrayed deep emo-
tion: "This means sending hundreds
of thousands of Russians to their
death. How can one not recoil before
such a decision1" Whereupon Sazonov
replied that the Tsar would be answer-
able neither to God nor to his own
conscience nor to the future generations
of the Russian people for the bloodshed
which would be caused by this terrible
war, forced on Russia and the whole of
Europe by the evil designs of her
enemies. For those enemies were re-
solved to ensure their power by sub·
jugating Russia's natural allies in the
Balkans and by destroying the historic
influence of Russia in that territory,
all of which would mean abandoning
Russia to a miserable existence entirely
dependent on the despotism of the Cen-
tral Powers.
It was a poor cause, especially since
Austria had declared that she had no
intention of disturbing the sovereignty
and integrity of Serbia. The Balkans
had already lived through so many
phases. There had been a time when
Austria had made a political vassal of
Serbia under King Milan, and after
the assassination of King Alexander
a complete reversal had taken place.
Why could Sazonov not wait? Had the
Austrians taken up arms when Russia
had completely changed the stat·us quo
in the Balkans in 1877?
Sazonov was afraid that Russia
might come too late with her mobiliza-
tion measures. He did not want to
"confuse" his allies. Apparently he
was animated by the urge toward the
battlefields. So we have to record the
case, probably rare in history, where
a Foreign Minister-who, after all,
should up till the last moment make
every effort to avoid war-accelerated
the decisions leading to war and re-
leased the terrible machinery that
started the avalanche rolling.
The American historian Fay. in his
book on the origins of the WorId War,
emphasizes in his last chapter that it
was above all Russia's general mobili-
zation being carried out while Ger-
many's efforts at mediation in Vienna
were still going on, which brought on
the final catastrophe by causing Ger-
many to mobilize and to declare war.
Russia saved France by her offensive
in East Prussia, which could not be
carried out fast enough for the French,
and the Russian people were then
driven on again and again to greater
efforts by the Allies whenever these
found themselves in danger. Russia
got no thanks for it, only reproaches.
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THE LURE OF CONSTANTINOPLE
When in Russia the dream of the
march on Berlin had faded, and the
sufferings of the Russian people inten-
sified, when the first whispers were
heard in Russia that one was only
fighting for the Allies, England realiz-
ed that a new impetus was needed to
keep Russia's policy in line. This
"stimulus for the continuation of the
war till victory," and till the complete
exhaustion of Russia, became forthwith
the object of the untiring attention of
Bl'itish diplomacy. The King of Eng-
land c8l:)ually remarked to the Russian
Ambassador Count Bencl<endorff: "As
for Constantinople, it is obvious that
it mu t belong to you." Now began
Sazonov's diplomatic task of utilizing
this British hint. It was supposed to
!,>1ve Russian diplomacy the possibility
of explaining to the people, with a
semblance of justification, why it had
drawn Russia into this disastrous war.
Sazonov demanded Constantinople
and the Straits; he stressed these de-
mand by threatening to resign and
by empha izing the "consequences in-
calculables" which might arise from a
refusal by the Allies. Delcasse, the
French Foreign Minister, who was
at first stunned by Sazonov's demands,
could not refute such arguments. He
was afraid that, if Sa~onov resigned,
a change might take place in Russian
policy, and that the efforts of "German
Agents" in St. Petersburg to conclude
a separate peaCe with Germany might
sllcceed. French policy, albeit reluct-
antly, followed that of England and
agreed to the Russian demands.
England had clearly understood the
situation from the beginning, and, as
we have seen. it was she who had
taken the initiative. One could only
make the Russians pay as dearly as
possible for this unavoidable conces-
sion. According to Grey's memoirs,
England was convinced that after the
loyalty of the Tsar toward the Allies
that of Sazonov was the corner-stone
of Russian policy. From Petrograd
had come the demand for an agreement
containing the promise of Constantino-
ple to the Russians, accompanied by
a hint that it was absolutely necessary
in order to save the situation as wen
as the policy of Sazonov, and in order
to avoid grave complications, i.e. the
conclusion of a separate peace. This
was no bluff, the danger was real. The
force of facts was irresistible.
England knew that, with the bait
of Constantinople, she held Russia in
her power, and that the lalter would
soon have to choose between either re-
taining the advantages of this pact
and bowing to the will of her Allies,
or betraying her Allies. which, accord-
ing to Churchill's words, she could
not do. That was the vicious circle in
which Sazonov found himself.
THE END OF SAZONOV
The downfall of Sazonov was brought
about by the Polish question. which
was the subject of violent controversy
in Russian public opinion and which
Sazonov wanted to solve by declaring
Poland's autonomy. He only wanted
to forestall the Central Powers, un-
conscious of the unreality of his idea.
Mter all, Russia had militarily lost
the greater part of Poland, and fur-
thermore, leading Russian circles had
doubts as to whether the restoration
of even a limited Polish sovereignty
would really be of benefit to Russia.
Many Russians who thought deeply
about the Polish problem may have
realized that it could really only be
solved in co-operation with Germany.
We know that the French and Bri-
tish Ambassadors made an eleventh
hour attempt to save Sazonov. Heavy
clouds were hanging over Russia, and,
even though the Entente diplomats
were not afraid that Russia was head-
ing for a separate peace, they never-
theless believed that with the going of
Sazonov a new spirit would insinuate
itself into the Foreign Ministry. This
spirit could, should military successes
not be forthcoming. become dangerous
to the policy of the Entente.
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THE END OF OLD RUSSIA.
It is an idle question whether, at this
time, Russia could have been saved by
a separate peace with Germany. The
Tsar, for one, could never have brought
himself to make such a weighty de-
cision. He had "vowed before God"
not to make peace as long as there was
a single enemy soldier on Russian soil,
and he was afraid his eternal salva-
,tiOD might be jeopardi~ed if he should
fail to keep his word. Moreover he
:was a fatalist; he believed in the de'-
crees of destiny. When things went
wrong, instead of offering resistance
he would say that God had willed it
80, and resign himself to God's will.
He was surrounded by mystics, char-
latans, and douQtful politicians; the
Tsarina ruled him with her fanatic
will; neither in domestic nor foreign
politics could he think of anything to
8&Ve the situation. And even if, after
the resignation of Sazonov, he had
wanted to change the course of Rus-
sia's foreign policy, he could hardly
have avoided a revolution, at least a
palace revolution. His fate was really
inescapable.
The indications that a great revolu-
tion was brewing became increasingly
serious. The scarcity of food assum-
ed alarming proportions, public opin-
ion became more and more agitated,
the Army could no longer be relied
upon; there was no possible bridge
leading to the Duma and the people,
no bridge that could have saved the
autocracy. In September 1916 the
French Ambassador Paleologue dined
with Kokovzov and the industrialist
Putilov. Kokovzov declared: "We
are facing revolution." The last act
of this terrible drama of Russia was
approaching:
"Last scene of all
That ends this strange eventful
history."
The assassination of Rasputin was-
the first stroke of lightning which lit
up the coming storm. The assassina-
tion was staged by the leader of the,
extreme Right, Purishkyevitch, ami
by a few Grand Dukes and relatives
of the Imperial House. It was a use-
less, typically Russian effort to save
the autocracy.
Rasputin had not only predicted his
own horrible death, but also the de-
struction of old Russia: "r see many
tortured people; I see not individuals
but whole multitudes, I see masses,
mountains of corpses, several of the,
Grand Dukes, hundreds of Counts.
The Neva will run red with blood,"
His prophecy was to come true.
